Protección al consumidor sin derecho

  • Omri Ben-Shahar The University of Chicago

Resumen

Explora mecanismos alternativos al sistema de protección al consumidor basado en remedios contractuales. Se plantea que, en la práctica, existen diversos mecanismos que surgen espontáneamente, sin necesidad de un diseño legal específico, y que suelen proteger mejor a los consumidores que los cuerpos normativos protectivos. En un contexto en el que parece concebirse a la protección al consumidor como una tarea puramente legislativa, el autor asume la tarea de cuestionar esta tendencia.

Biografía del autor/a

Omri Ben-Shahar, The University of Chicago
Omri Ben-Shahar earned his PhD in economics and SJD from Harvard and his BA and LLB from the Hebrew University. Before coming to Chicago, he was the Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law and Economics at the University of Michigan. Prior to that he taught at Tel-Aviv University, was a member of Israel's Antitrust Court, and clerked at the Supreme Court of Israel. He teaches Contracts, Sales, Insurance Law, Consumer Law, eCommerce, Law and Economics, and Game Theory and the Law. He writes in the fields of contract law and consumer law. Ben Shahar is the Director of the Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics, and the Editor of the Journal of Legal Studies. He is also the Co-Reporter for the ALI's Principles of Consumer Contracts (with Oren Bar-Gill).
Publicado
2013-03-18
Sección
Artículos